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Labor Culture: Labor Morality under Socialism 
Vladimir Magun 
 
Soviet leaders had always taken a keen interest in workers' behavior and 
labor motives and sought to keep labor morality under strict state control. 
A complex network of values and regulations was developed for this 
purpose after the October Revolution of 1917. They were best articulated 
in the "political economy of socialism" which purported to present a 
scientific picture of the country's economic life. Textbooks on socialist 
economy were widely circulated in the Soviet Union and appropriate 
courses included into a core curriculum for all higher education institutions 
in the country. Basic tenets of socialist political economy were taught in 
introductory social science classes in high schools. Leading educators 
helped popularize the subject, while major research centers in the nation 
continued to perfect the science of socialist economics. A prominent place 
in socialist political economy was given to work ethics, labor motives, 
employment opportunities, reward structure and other characteristics 
which formed socialist labor culture. In this chapter, I shall examine 
socialist labor morality, the relationship between the official Soviet 
blueprints and unofficial realities, the changes that socialist labor culture 
underwent in recent years, and the emerging trends in labor morality and 
work ethics in post-Soviet society. 
Work and Employment in the Socialist Ideology 
To begin with, all things connected with labor had a special significance in 
the state ideology that evolved in Russia after the communists came to 
power. The revolution itself was justified by the need to put an end to the 
exploitation of labor, to eliminate capitalists who misappropriated the 
"surplus value" produced by the proletariat, and to level social and 
economic differences separating various classes in society. These tasks 
were to be accomplished by rooting out private property, socializing the 
means of production, eliminating the class of private entrepreneurs, and 
radically restructuring the institution of labor. 
The political slogans which propelled the bolsheviks to power sidestepped 
the production and labor process proper and focused instead on the 
distribution and redistribution of the wealth produced in the pre-
revolutionary Russia. However, as the new social order began to stabilize, 
the communist leaders' attention shifted to production and the need to 
motivate workers in their daily labors. Gradually, the Soviet Union 
transformed itself into what Hannah Arendt called " "work society" where 
"work and labour activity are not only a natural precondition for human 
existence, but where work also has a central cultural value and where 
work institutions assume a central role in the entire societal structure." 
[1] In effect, Soviet ideology surrounded labor with a sacred halo and 
pronounced hard work on behalf of the state to be each citizen's sacred 
duty. This ideology was inspired by orthodox Marxism, and specifically by 
its emphasis on activity, labor-created value, toiling proletariat as an 
embodiment of social progress, and the central role that tool-aided 
behavior was supposed to have played in the human evolution. [2] 
Every able-bodied individual, according to Soviet ideology, had to be 
inducted into the labor force: dodging employment and living on unearned 
income were condemned. The Soviet constitution faithfully reflected this 
precept. Thus the last version of the constitution adopted by the former 
Soviet Union read: "It is the duty, as well as the honor, for every able-
bodied citizen in the USSR to work conscientiously in his chosen, socially 
useful activity, and strictly to observe labor discipline. Evading socially 
useful work is incompatible with the principles of socialist society." 
[3] Based on this principle, several legal acts were passed by the Supreme 
Soviet that criminalized so-called "social parasites" or job shirkers. Among 
the more sensational cases stemming from these laws was the conviction 
of the poet Joseph Brodsky for parasitism. Brodsky, who would later be 
awarded Nobel Price in literature, was exiled to the northern Arkhangelsk 
Region where he was to submit to "forced employment." As the basis for 
his ruling, the judge cited the May 4, 1961 , resolution passed by the 
Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet that called for 
additional measures against those evading public labor. Labor-centrism 
came to the fore during the official campaign against "unearned incomes," 
triggered by the special decree on "Combatting Unearned Incomes" that 
was issued by the Supreme Soviet in 1986. This decree put a criminal spin 
on even those limited forms of independent economic activity that were 
hitherto available to Soviet citizens, such as selling produce from the puny 
plots owned by the members of collective farms. The decree also cast a 
shadow over the inheritance practices, lottery winnings, gifts from 
relatives, and other earnings unrelated to a person's work. [4] 
Another economic tenet that circumscribed the labor process in Soviet 
society concerned the ownership over the production means: land, raw 
materials, machinery, labor tools, etc. The socialist political economy 
sanctioned two basic forms of ownership: national and 
cooperative/collective. In both cases, workers were cast as co-owners with 
equal stakes in the production means and work products. As to the private 
ownership over the production means and the private entrepreneurship it 
engendered, these were pronounced alien to socialism. Engaging in 
private enterprise became a criminal activity. As a result, both evading 
work (failure to be gainfully employed in an official enterprise) and the 
most active form of employment (engaging in a private enterprise) 
appeared to be outlawed. The only recognized form of employment was 
hired labor for the state, which stood behind every industrial and service 
enterprise in the nation, or for the collective farm in agriculture, which 
legally constituted a separate form of ownership but in practice did not 
differ much from the state owned enterprises. 
A closer look at this form of employment suggests that it did not live up to 
its official billing. Socialist ideology touted employees as public property 
co-owners who worked for nobody else but themselves. An appropriate 
quotation from Lenin was usually invoked to justify this point, which said 
that "for the first time after centuries of work for others, coercive toil for 
the exploiters, the possibility of work for oneself has become a reality." 
[5] In fact, socialist workers did not have any say in important economic 
decisions -- the functions that normally come with the ownership rights -- 
and thus could hardly be construed as co-owners. [6] 
The co-ownership ruse accomplished an important goal: under the 
premises of the socialist political economy, the labor force could no longer 
be seen as a saleable commodity. This, in turn, allowed the communist 
party ideologists to claim that there was no labor market under socialism. 
Indeed, how could citizens, who own all property, sell their labor to 
themselves? References to "selling" and "purchasing" labor, "price of 
labor" and "wage labor," were discarded as inapplicable to the socialist 
system. Wherever the words "hire" and "wage labor" would crop up, they 
usually appeared in quotation marks and were used with reservations. 
Here is a sample of rationalizations designed by the socialist political 
economists to buttress this point: 
As they together own the means of production, employees cannot sell 
their labor force to themselves. [7] 
Those who own the production means can't purchase their ability to work 
from themselves. [8] 
The working class cannot sell its labor power to itself, since it owns the 
production means. Consequently, only the outward appearance of hire 
survives when it comes to the employees' relation to society through 
which they implement their right to work. [9] 
Normative Motives and Workers' Attitudes 
The ideological constructs presented above go to the heart of socialist 
ideology and define in the broadest terms the place that this ideology 
accorded to labor in society. In addition to these general principles, the 
socialist political economy articulated more specific normative guidelines 
pertaining to the goals and motivations of socialist labor. Two instructive 
distinctions could be singled out in regard to socialist labor motives and 
goals. The first one involved the distinction between personal and public 
interests that motivate labor activity. Personal interests included the 
worker's own needs, as well as those of his family. Public interests 
referred to the well-being of the collective and community as a whole. The 
second relevant distinction juxtaposed two types of the worker's interests: 
"spiritual" and "material." Spiritual needs were linked to the labor process 
itself and were defined as the satisfaction that the worker derives from 
work well done, from finding an outlet for one's creativity, from respect 
that a hard-working person earns from his co-workers. Material needs had 
to do with the remuneration for one's contribution to public production, be 
this in the form of salary or non-monetary benefits. This normative 
distinction partly coincides with what students of labor call "intrinsic" and 
"extrinsic" labor motives, [10] or work as a "value in itself" and as an 
"instrumental" activity. [11] 
Up to the late-80's, the official Soviet ideology clearly favored public over 
private interests and spiritual over material labor motives. The priority 
given to public motives perfectly fitted the totalitarian mold of Soviet 
society, which subordinated the individual to the state. The disdain for the 
worker's personal interests was camouflaged with the notion that public 
ownership over production means gave everybody the same stake in the 
production process and assured that personal or private interests were in 
the end identical with the interests of the community as a whole. After all, 
does not every socialist worker toil for himself, even if he is technically a 
state employee? Does not he own the product of his labor, even if he 
cannot dispose of it personally? And would not he therefore naturally be 
inclined to value the manager's directives as his own? 
Such were the normative expectations that the Soviet ideologists harbored 
about communist work ethics. The actual labor morality among Soviet 
workers was another story. Indicative in this respect was the workers' 
reaction to the late 20s campaign promoting exemplary labor by individual 
workers and work teams. This officially approved initiative aimed at 
lowering general pay rates, raising production quotas, speeding work 
processes, introducing penalties for substandard performance, etc. The 
campaign did not sit well with workers who, as researchers would later 
point out, resisted pressure to intensify the labor process. [12] Clearly, 
workers were unwilling to sacrifice personal interests to "public good." 
Even so-calledudarniki -- exemplary workers routinely overfulfilling their 
production quotas -- did not surrender their own and their families' 
interests. But whenudarniki complained about low pay rates, they risked 
being branded greedy profiteers or shkurniki by trade union bosses who 
threatened to disband their work teams. Nor were Soviet peasants thrilled 
by the prospects of being herded into collective farms and working for 
anybody else but themselves and their families. 
Numerous developments attest to the fact that official labor morality and 
everyday Soviet reality did not coincide. This would become more evident 
in post-Stalinist Russia , when workers would sometimes be driven to 
direct actions protesting the official indifference to their basic needs. One 
of the most dramatic events of this kind happened in 1962 in the city of 
Novocherkask , where the authorities called in the troops to stamp out a 
demonstration by workers protesting the hikes in food prices. [13] 
The data from sociological surveys point in the same direction. Thus an 
important study of workers from 12 industrial enterprises in Leningrad 
conducted in 1976 by Dr. Vladimir Yadov and his associates revealed that 
between 63 and 73 percent of those polled listed good earnings as the 
most valuable quality they are looking for in a job. No more than 6% of 
respondents mentioned the opportunity to participate in management 
decisions as an important job specification and only 18% singled out a 
job's "creative content." 
The study of Russian immigrants further corroborate these findings. 
[14] Among the factors negatively effecting the Soviet economy, Russian 
immigrants, who were polled in the 1970's, listed low earnings, poor 
working conditions, the shortage of consumer goods, and bad housing 
accommodations -- all the factors pertaining to the workers' personal and 
family well-being. Thus, we can argue that material interests, rather than 
ideologically inspired spiritual needs, predominated in the Soviet workers' 
values since at least the middle-1970's. [15] 
Realizing the gap between normative expectations and everyday labor 
morality, Soviet ideologists emphasized the transitional nature of socialist 
society, which was conceived in Marxism as the initial phase of the 
communist socio-economic formation. It is only with the onset of 
communism -- the ultimate stage of social evolution -- that the spiritual 
labor motives would fully inform labor morality. This is how Lenin 
described this historically new type of labor ethics: 
Communist labor, in the narrower and stricter sense of the term, is free 
labor for society's sake; labor done not as duty, not to win the right to 
certain products, not according to pre-set legalized quotas, but voluntary 
labor without quotas and without expectations of remuneration; labor as 
the custom to work for the common good and as a conscious (and 
habitual) realization of the necessity to labor for the common good; labor 
as a need of a healthy body. [16] 
One could trace this stance taken by Lenin to the well-known passage in 
Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program," which stated that "at the highest 
stage of communist society, . . . labor will cease to be solely a means of 
living and become in itself a primary necessity of life." [17] Lenin's words 
were, in some cases, even stronger. [18] 
But this distinction between the two phases of communism -- socialism as 
the initial stage of the communist production mode and the ultimate stage 
of fully developed communism -- gave to socialist ideologists an inferiority 
complex clearly evident in the apologetic tone with which they described 
the the motivational dynamics actually observed under socialism. 
The Protestant and Communist Labor Ethics 
A comparison between communist work ethics and the Protestant 
(capitalist) work ethic is clearly in order here. Both the Protestant work 
ethic as analyzed by Max Weber in his classic study [19] and Soviet 
models of labor morality are distinguished by their emphasis on labor as a 
vital sphere of human activity. Both tend to underplay the personal and 
family consumption motives as a primary basis for labor activity. The 
elevation of spiritual needs over material ones in the Soviet ideology 
offers an instructive parallel to the religious motives that propelled early 
capitalists in their economic undertakings. In the Soviet case, we also 
have tangible evidence that real personal consumption was kept at a 
minimum. This can be gleaned from a comparison between the public 
consumption and industrial accumulation funds in the Soviet era. During 
the early stages of rapid industrialization in the Soviet Union, the relative 
weight of consumption funds dwindled while that of accumulation funds 
grew from 10-15 to 40-45 percent. In later years, capital accumulation 
funds sometimes accounted for more than 60 percent of the national 
income in the Soviet Union. [20] 
The early capitalist growth in the West revealed some similar cultural 
trends, including attempts to curb consumer motivation in Calvinist 
ideology, which denounced the most conspicuous forms of consumption as 
a sinful practice. According to this ideology, it was one's success in 
practical activity that should be displayed, not personal wealth that 
accrued to the individual as a result of his labor. And whatever resources 
were left unused in personal consumption, were to be reinvested in 
production, thereby maximizing the amount of divine grace that devolved 
on a successful entrepreneur. [21] 
Besides these parallels, there were fundamental differences between the 
labor ethics championed by the socialist and Protestant ideologies. While 
the former renounced private ownership, the latter appealed to personal 
initiative firmly rooted in private property. Another point that formally 
divided the two models concerned the manner in which the individual was 
to be fully rewarded for his efforts: the socialist ideology promised a state 
of bliss in this world as soon as the full-blown communism comes into its 
own, while Protestant teaching saw salvation fully attainable only in the 
world to come. Given a somewhat uncertain time frame within which full-
blown communism was to be expected, the socialist promise tended to 
recede into an indefinite future and thus was to be redeemed only for the 
"generations to come." 
As we can see, Protestant ethics and socialist labor morality helped 
motivate labor during the early stages of capital accumulation, with the 
Protestant model accentuating personal efforts on the basis of private 
property and the socialist model stressing individual efforts on the basis of 
state ownership as the surest path towards rapid industrialization in the 
Soviet Union . However, if the Protestant work ethic gave rise to the 
"spirit of capitalism" and spurred economic growth in the West, secular 
socialist ideology failed to generate the "spirit of communism" and to 
furnish the foundation for sustained economic growth in the socialist East. 
BEYOND THE SOCIALIST LABOR MORALITY 
The fundamental cultural and economic changes that shook Soviet society 
in the late 1980's and that continue to unfold at present could not but 
affect labor morality. Let us now turn to the new developments in Russian 
labor culture. In addition to the normative and ideological blueprints for 
labor ethics which preoccupied us in the previous section, we shall also 
focus on the current trends in everyday labor culture as revealed in recent 
sociological inquiries into labor motives and work ethics. We begin with 
the changing employment patterns. 
The Diversification of Normative Employment Patterns 
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence that the dogmas of socialist 
economics have lost their magic power was the legalization of private 
enterprise. Suppressed and prosecuted for many decades, private 
entrepreneurial activity was not reinstated overnight. The first movement 
in this direction was the official blessing that Mikhail Gorbachev bestowed 
on cooperative enterprises. Private enterprise was further strengthened by 
the law on "Enterprises and Entrepreneurship" passed by the Russian 
Parliament, which among other things spelled out the entrepreneurial 
rights. [22] The Constitution adopted by the Russian Federation during the 
December '93 national referendum stipulated that "every person has the 
right to use freely his abilities and property to engage in entrepreneurial 
and other economic activities unrestricted by law." [23] 
As to public opinion, its growing acceptance of entrepreneurship is 
reflected in the polls, which point to an increasing number of individuals 
wishing to start their own businesses. The figures are impressive, even if 
it is clear that some respondents are unprepared to follow through on 
their expressed wishes. For example, the October 1990 opinion survey 
probed the Soviet urban population's interest in various kinds of 
businesses and the production means they would like to obtain. The poll 
listed common businesses like shops, restaurants, service outlets, etc. The 
results pointed to a significant number of individuals who wanted to open 
up their own business, even though no opportunity might exist for this in 
the present: a third of Russian citizens living in urban areas expressed an 
interest in starting their own business. And this was before the massive 
push toward privatization in post-Gorbachev Russia . The numbers were 
even more impressive in other republics of the former Soviet Union : 43% 
in the Ukraine , and over 50% in Armenia , Moldova , Georgia and 
Lithuania. [24] A poll conducted a year later showed that fully 20% of 
Moscow high school graduates would like to open up a private business. 
[25] 
Entrepreneurial activity was even less threatening and unheard of to the 
farmers. Since the early 30s, Soviet agriculture entailed two sectors: the 
public/collective sector which absorbed most of the arable lands in the 
nation and the private one, comprised by the small plots assigned to 
farmers and their families for private use. While the private sector 
included a fraction of the nation's lands used in agriculture, it accounted 
for half of all potatoes and one third of eggs and meat sold in the Soviet 
Union during recent decades. Clearly, we are dealing here with private 
business based on the labor of farmers and their family members, a 
rudimentary capitalist sector which, in spite of adverse conditions, existed 
throughout the Soviet era and continues to flourish today. [26] 
Private enterprise needs both an entrepreneur and hired labor. During the 
early perestroika years, Socialist ideologists sneered at free enterprise 
because it would restore the "exploitation" of hired labor allegedly absent 
under socialism, a system supposedly incompatible with work for hire. 
Contrary to such sentiments, the urban majority in Russia and other 
Soviet republics supported hired labor. By the end of 1990, the 
opportunity to work for a private owner was endorsed by most people in 
the Soviet Union , except for respondents in Turkmenia , Kirghizia , and 
Kazakhstan . The three Baltic republics, along with Armenia and Ukraine , 
registered the biggest majorities favoring this type of employment. 
[27] Moreover, as recent studies show, employment at a private 
enterprise is now a more attractive option than work at a state-owned 
outlet. [28] 
All these changes in the legal environment and public opinion led to the 
rapid growth of new employment patterns. The statistical data shows that 
by early 1993, sixteen million people in the Russian Federation were 
employed in new enterprises, almost all of these privately owned. 
[29] Judged by self-reports, 30 percent of those employed claim that they 
are engaged in profit-oriented activities, including 8 percent who consider 
themselves enterprise co-owners with a voice in the decision making 
process and 3 percent -- sole enterprise owners. [30] Taken together, 
these findings clearly suggest that public opinion in Russia has endorsed 
employment at non-state enterprises. 
Another interesting feature pertaining to the employment situation in 
Russia is the proliferation of secondary employment that allows the 
individual to supplement income from a primary job. As we saw above, 
this phenomenon was widely spread in the rural areas, where work on 
one's private plot constituted secondary employment. Now the multiple 
employment pattern, once denounced by the Soviet authorities, is 
beginning to spread in the cities, especially the big ones. In November of 
1993, 40 percent of the adult male population in big cities had two or 
more jobs. [31] To be sure, many people are forced to seek secondary 
employment to supplement their meager incomes eaten up by relentless 
inflation. At the same time, a person is more independent from any single 
employer when he holds several jobs and for the first time feels that he 
indeed owns his labor power, skills, and abilities. Thus a genuine 
mobilization of labor resources is taking place in Russia , and this is not 
just by drawing new workers into the economic process but through the 
more intensive involvement of the seasoned and most active part of the 
labor force. 
We have examined some of the new employment opportunities sanctioned 
by the Russian state and generally endorsed by public opinion. Alongside 
these changes came the official recognition of unemployment, which for a 
long time was decried as incompatible with socialism. The Employment Act 
adopted by the Russian Parliament on April 19, 1991 , explicitly defined 
the status of the unemployed, spelled out the procedures covering 
unemployment registration, and outlined benefits that the unemployed 
could receive from the state. [32] 
Naturally, most Russian citizens are not thrilled at the prospect of losing 
their and would like to see full employment guaranteed by the state. 
However, if we are to judge from the polls, a substantial part of the 
Russian population is growing accustomed to the grim reality of 
joblessness and is beginning to adapt to such a possibility. [33] Several 
million Russian workers have already had first-hand experience of being 
unemployed. 
Just a decade ago, such a situation would have seemed preposterous, as 
the experts unanimously predicted labor shortage. This judgment, based 
on the extrapolation of the past socio-economic trends into the future, 
runs afoul of the radical changes that swept the country in the last few 
years. [34] 
These employment trends had their impact on labor discipline. A survey of 
personnel managers at several large Moscow enterprises conducted in the 
Summer of 1992 revealed that workers were reportedly growing more 
disciplined and responsible -- a shift that personnel managers greeted 
with approval and that could be attributed largely to the uncertain labor 
market and increased likelihood of layoffs. [35] We can expect the 
transition to a market economy and the sobering effect that 
unemployment exerts on labor discipline to have a continuous impact on 
labor ethics. 
In addition to involuntary unemployment, we should mention an important 
cultural change in public attitudes towards individuals who do not wish to 
be involved in the labor process. Before perestroika, every able-bodied 
Soviet citizen of working age was obligated to seek public employment. 
But the Russian Federation Employment Act, adopted on April 19, 1991, 
stipulates that "citizens possess the exclusive right to dispose of their 
capacity for productive and creative labor. Coercive employment is 
inadmissible with the exception of cases expressly stipulated by the law. 
Non-employment should not give grounds for administrative or any other 
liability." [36] This change is duly reflected in the current Russian 
Constitution which no longer mentions employment as a duty, even 
though it still stipulates the right to dispose freely of one's labor power, to 
choose one's occupation, to obtain the remuneration for one's work 
without any discrimination, and to be protected from unemployment. 
One can hardly overestimate the importance of all these transformations 
in the Russian labor law and labor morality. Labor is loosing its halo of 
sacredness with which it appears in a socialist society. It is no longer seen 
as an obligation rooted in the individual's responsibility to the state and is 
increasingly conceived as a matter of personal choice. At the same time, 
the new labor morality enriched employment patterns in the country and 
encouraged entrepreneurial initiative. We can see this in the fact that 
individuals began to feel themselves as real owners of their labor force. 
They act less as state employees and more like sellers of their work force. 
But this newly acquired taste for freedom confronted the Russian work 
force with fresh problems and serious responsibilities that the market 
economy brought in its wake. 
The Current Trends in Labor Attitudes and Values 
As we noticed above, Soviet society could never overcome the gap 
between the official labor ethics that touted public good along with job 
content as normative labor motives and the real motivation that propelled 
Soviet workers, most of whom saw their labor as a means of furthering 
their personal and family well-being. The breakdown of totalitarianism 
effectively eliminates this contradiction. In the late 80s and early 90s, the 
fundamental cultural shift took place, which legitimized personal interests 
and private life. Fully rehabilitated were also material, bodily needs which 
used to be denigrated as secondary and base compared to the higher 
spiritual needs. The "base" bodily functions grow in importance and 
become culturally at least as legitimate as the "lofty" spiritual ones. 
[37] In the same perspective we should judge the parallel cultural 
rehabilitation of personal wealth and private property, as well as the 
vastly expanded access to real goods now legally available to individuals 
and families. 
Hence, it should come as no surprise that today, like in the 70s, private, 
material interests workers' job motivation. Two surveys, one conducted in 
1989 and the other in 1990, polled factory workers about jobs they would 
have liked to perform. [38] The respondents were asked to choose any 
number of required job characteristics from among seventeen possible job 
features presented by the researchers. The responses indicate that the 
majority of the individuals polled marked the items directly bearing on 
their personal interests and their family's well-being. The opportunity for 
good earnings topped the list, while the possibility to improve housing 
conditions with the employer's help, to operate in a comfortable working 
environment, to use reliable and safe industrial equipment, and to deal 
with agreeable and likable co-workers closely followed. "Good earnings" 
were singled out as important by 70% of all respondents, compared to 43-
44% of those polled who gave high rating to an "interesting job." This list 
of leading personal motives combines the desire to maximize job 
"rewards" and reduce to a minimum personal "costs" associated with poor 
working conditions, faulty tools, and tension in the work place. This 
finding is remarkably consistent with the world-wide trends detected by R. 
Inglehart and his associates in the World Values Survey of more than 
twenty countries, including Russia . The Russian survey conducted in the 
beginning of 1991[39] showed that 80% of respondents marked "good 
earnings" as an important job characteristic. If we compare these results 
to the 1976 study, we can see that the Russian workers' values have 
remained stable for at least two decades. The desire to earn more -- not 
to labor for work's sake as a primary human need -- had motivated 
Russian workers during this entire period. Very tangible are the changes in 
the range and quality of goods and services that workers aspire to 
purchase with their money. With the barrier to the free flow of information 
coming down, the Russian population has developed consumption 
expectations that are not dissimilar in principle from those commonly 
found in the West. This increase in consumption (and consequently in 
salary) expectations could be gleaned from the comparison between 
expectations of the high school graduates' in 1985 and the early 90s: The 
findings of this study, [40] which used such indicators as the desire to 
own a car, private summer cottage, etc. Noteworthy is also the fact that 
the growth in salary and consumption aspirations goes hand in hand with 
the diminished willingness on the part of employees to expend a given 
amount of their labor power in order to satisfy their aspirations. Thus the 
above mentioned comparative study of adolescents revealed that in the 
last few years, there was a noticeable drop in the willingness of young 
people to face labor hardships (such as to work in cold climates, apart 
from their families, in especially labor-intensive and monotonous job 
settings, etc.). 
Yuri Levada reports similar results. The two surveys, one conducted in 
1988 and the other in 1992, asked Russian citizens the same question: 
"What do you think is important to be successful in life?" During the four 
years that elapsed between the first and second poll, the proportion of the 
respondents who answered that the requirement for success was "hard 
and deliberate work" dropped from 45 to 32 percent. [41] In light of these 
findings, it is easier to understand why the desire to increase personal 
earnings shares the top billing with the desire to minimize personal cost in 
the hierarchy of job values of the contemporary Russian worker. 
It is common to interpret the revolution of consumptive expectations and 
the decline in the willingness to face work hardships as a sign of the 
breakdown in moral values. But I think it would be more appropriate to 
criticize past labor ethics which demanded hard work in exchange for few 
tangible goods or for a mere reprieve from punishment. It is to mask the 
absurdity of such a demand that the socialist labor morality goaded the 
employees to enjoy the labor process itself and derive satisfaction from 
the fact that they participate in the great adventure of building a 
communist society. Given this history of labor morality in the Soviet Union 
, the current aversion to hard work and sacrifices could be seen as an 
understandable reaction to the traditional Soviet labor culture. 
However, the unwillingness to expend personal effort should not be 
overinterpreted. It should be judged against the backdrop of growing 
multiple or secondary employment, which shows that Russian workers 
want not so much to curtail their gross labor efforts and expenditures as 
to decrease the relative weight of their personal labor efforts needed to 
produce one item of output for a unit of pay. The current trends might be 
described as the shift from the lower to higher cost-benefit ratio of the 
individual's rewards to his/her costs. Hardly justified, therefore, are those 
commentators who believe that "it is hard to lure a nation like Russia into 
a chase for more money -- a more sublime goal is needed to get it going." 
[42] Personal and family prosperity is rapidly turning into a sublime goal 
that beckons the Russian labor force toward a better future. 
Labor-Management Relations 
As the official lies about the employees owning the production means have 
been exposed, the hard-edged truths about wage labor for the state grew 
more and more evident to the Russian workers. These truths might be 
painful, but they also have a positive effect on labor, which takes stock of 
its shared interests and sets out to defend them through their own labor 
organizations -- independent trade unions, strike committees, workers' 
councils, etc. [43] The turning point was the mass strikes by Soviet 
miners in 1989. These strikes exploded the communist myths about labor 
as a spiritual need and about the natural harmony prevailing in the labor-
management relations under socialism. After decades of submission, 
Russian state employees moved to assert their group interests. [44] 
The dynamics of attitudes toward ownership and industrial management 
yield ample evidence that the labor force in Russia is not only conscious of 
its group interests but also willing to act on them. We have mentioned 
earlier the research on values which demonstrated the salaried workers' 
central concern with good earnings and personal/family well-being. The 
same study attempted to gauge the wage-earners' interest in co-
managing their enterprises. The respondents were presented with several 
options, ranging from the readiness to cede to the outside owners all 
operational control over a given enterprise to the arrangement where the 
employees own their enterprise and elect their own managers. More than 
half of Russian respondents preferred an option where they could own 
their enterprise collectively and appoint their managers. Among the 
countries which participated in this international survey, this was by far 
the highest figure. [45] 
A closer analysis yields some further insight into the wage-earners' 
preference for the participation in enterprise management. Among the 
countries involved in this survey, the ex-socialist entities ( Poland , Russia 
, Belorus , Latvia ) are the most committed to the scheme which involves 
employees in the property ownership and management at their 
enterprises. As we can see, even the cardinal change in the outlook on 
ownership and property relations that has occurred in Russia in recent 
years did not alter the salaried workers' preference for collective forms of 
privatizing the nation's means of production. 
Another sign that hired labor regards its own interests first and foremost 
can be gleaned from the answer to the following question: "Some say that 
one should follow instructions of one's superior even when one does not 
fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one's superior's 
instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. With which of 
these two options do you agree?" The answers included the following 
options: 
"Should follow instructions" (one point) 
"First see if they are correct" (three points) 
"[It] Depends" (two points) 
The "insubordination index" compiled on the basis of these answers shows 
that the Russian population scored the highest on their readiness to 
second-guess and defy the managers' decisions. [46] Other ex-socialist 
countries took the second place in their labor force's readiness to interfere 
with the management decisions. 
The high score that Russian respondents showed on the insubordination 
scale supports Stark and Burawoy's studies in which the authors examined 
the management patterns in socialist countries. According to Stark, who 
studied Hungarian enterprises, the socialist economy combines centralized 
planning at the national economic level with the market-style haggling 
between workers and managers at the shop-floor level. [47] Burawoy, 
who worked at a Russian factory for several months, was amazed at the 
extent to which the actual labor process under socialism had diverged 
from the official prescriptions: "From a capitalist perspective it is difficult 
to understand how such anarchy in production could lead to an enterprise 
as successful as Polar Furniture. The secret of the capitalist enterprise lies 
in the managerial control over production, a control entirely absent at 
Polar [the Russian factory name]." [48] 
After decades of neglect suffered from their communist bosses, members 
of the ex-socialist labor force want to assert their dignity and human 
rights. They resent the political and trade union leaders who 
misrepresented their interests in the past, they are fed up with the 
situation when they are extolled to work hard for a token remuneration, 
and they are contemptuous of their incompetent bosses. Given these 
long-standing grievances, one can understand why workers might be 
trying to carry out their newly found democratic freedoms into the 
economic sphere. Yet, like workers in capitalist countries, they may have 
to learn to live with democratic institutions in the political sphere and the 
autocratic management practices prevalent in a capitalist economy. [49] 
Conclusion: Towards a Post-Soviet Labor Ethic 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that socialism created its own labor 
culture, which included specific labor values and labor morality. This labor 
morality successfully functioned as a mobilizing device during the period 
of forced industrialization but gradually lost its legitimacy and yielded to 
unofficial norms that markedly differed from the orthodox doctrine. These 
changes laid a motivational groundwork for a market economy, which 
appeared on the micro level way before the macro-social framework for 
market economy was in place. What this means, among other things, is 
that the transformation of the socialist system into a market economy has 
deep roots in the consciousness of Russian people and is not something 
artificially imposed on it from without. 
The anti-totalitarian revolution brought in its wake a new labor culture 
which is based on private property on the production assets and, even 
more importantly, on the real ownership of the individual over his labor 
force, including his freedom to dispose of it as he sees fit. At the head of 
the new labor culture is the consumer interests of the worker and his 
family. Its other relevant component is the close attention that salaried 
workers pay to the cost-benefit ratio of their work. This norm, which is 
now being extended to other economic resources besides labor, is akin to 
personal thriftiness that played such a central role at the dawn of Western 
capitalism as an element of the protestant ethic. 
The new labor morality requires proper ideology to back it up. Fully 
legitimized labor norms, in turn, could help mobilize labor in the post-
Soviet market place. Whether Russia can pull from its present economic 
crisis and evolve into a prosperous society depends in large measure on 
the success of this process. 
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